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ABSTRACT
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has received significant inter-
est in recent years notably due to the advancements made in deep
reinforcement learning which have allowed for the developments
of new architectures and learning algorithms. However, while they
have been successful at solving stationary games, there has been
less development in cooperation-type games due to the nature
of these algorithms to optimize their play against the opponent’s
current strategy and don’t consider how that strategy can change.
Using social dilemmas, notably the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IPD) as the training ground, we present a novel learning archi-
tecture, Learning through Probing (LTP), where Q-learning agents
utilize a probing mechanism to determine how an opponent’s strat-
egy changes when an agent takes an action. We use distinct train-
ing phases and adjust rewards according to the overall outcome
of the experiences accounting for changes to the opponents be-
havior. We introduce a parameter η to determine the significance
of these future changes to opponent behavior. When applied to
the IPD, LTP agents demonstrate that they can learn to cooperate
with each other, achieving higher average cumulative rewards than
other reinforcement learning methods while also maintaining good
performance in playing against static agents that are present in
Axelrod tournaments. We compare this method with traditional re-
inforcement learning algorithms and agent-tracking techniques to
highlight key differences and potential applications. We also draw
attention to the differences between solving games and studying be-
haviour using societal-like interactions and analyze the training of
Q-learning agents in makeshift societies. This is to emphasize how
cooperation may emerge in societies and demonstrate this using
environments where interactions with opponents are determined
through a random encounter format of the IPD.
KEYWORDS
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Agent Learning
INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) has garnered a significant
amount of interest in recent years also due to the advancements
in deep RL which has allowed for extensive study on agent behav-
iors. There has been emphasis on designing cooperative agents for
decades [12, 31] yet extending this success to multi-agent environ-
ments has proven difficult as the Markov property is not satisfied
since agent behaviors are continuously changing [30] and the use
of experience replay does little to inhibit unstable learning in pres-
ence of multiple learners. Indeed, there are still challenges to be
tackled in order to enable broader applications, e.g., in automated
decision-making such as self-driving cars, personalized assistants,
and the eventuality of artificial agents operating in society. A cen-
tral aspect of this evolution lies in understanding the competitive
and collaborative nature of environments and the emergence of
such behaviors [2, 21].
Humans have cooperated and maintained cooperation to great
effect, which has been paramount for the development of civiliza-
tion [2, 3, 8]. Many plants and animals have also demonstrated
the tendency to cooperate with relatives and have even been ob-
served cooperating with members of a different species even in
highly competitive environments, likely to take advantage of long-
term rewards [6, 29]. The evolution of cooperation in competitive
environments has therefore been relevant to studies in econom-
ics, game-theory, psychology, social science, and now computer
science as the future will certainly demand interaction between
artificial agents in human and artificial societies. The emergence of
cooperative and competitive strategies has been studied in Social
Dilemmas [14, 15, 23, 34]. These are games where an individual
profits from selfishness unless everyone chooses to behave self-
ishly, in which case the group as a whole achieves an undesirable
outcome. In other words, problems arise when too many group
members choose to pursue individual profit and immediate satis-
faction rather than behave in the group’s best long-term interests.
From a game-theoretic perspective, the dominant strategy in social
dilemmas is often to behave selfishly, which results in arriving at a
Nash Equilibria that can be described as socially deficient [15] and
is an undesirable result. One of the first and most studied examples
of social dilemmas is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a two-player
social dilemma that is formalized by a payoff matrix and a dominant
strategy to defect despite a collaborative effort from both players
leading to a higher reward. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
is an extended, sequential version of the PD that has often been
the focus for multi-agent RL. In order to succeed in these types of
games, it is important for each agent to distinguish between how
to play against the current strategy of their opponent and how
their opponent’s strategy might change to be either more or less
cooperative as a result of their own actions as time goes on.
Most RL algorithms are designed for single-agent case scenarios.
Qualitatively, the Q-value describes how much reward an agent is
expected to receive when taking a particular action at a particu-
lar state [30]. As the environment changes, the learned Q-values
become increasingly irrelevant and this is exemplified as the num-
ber of agents who are learning increases. Other research projects
have aimed to address the issue of non-stationarity in multi-agent
environments in a variety of ways ranging from refreshing the
experience replay buffer [15] using importance sampling [10, 33] to
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stabilize learning, using defined policy-types [16], agent-tracking
techniques to predict the policy of an opposing agent [10, 17, 32, 35],
and centralized functions to share information across to all par-
ticipating agents [17]. To tackle this, we instead propose a train-
ing mechanism, Learning through Probing, which allows agents
to gather experiences that have been adjusted to reflect behav-
ioral changes in a sequence of events over a period of time via
an adjusted reward signal and, therefore, enables them to learn
cooperative strategies. Experimentally, we demonstrate that two
agents trained with this approach learn to cooperate in the IPD
as each agent accounts for the opposing agent’s learning while
also revealing how their own behavior will change as a result of an
opposing agent’s chosen actions. Furthermore, we also demonstrate
how this type of training mechanism results in a RL agent learning
optimal policies for the IPD when matched with other stationary
and quasi-stationary strategies from Axelrod tournaments. Finally,
we contrast this with current methodologies in multi-agent RL to
highlight potential difficulties and we discuss how probing and
using experiences through updates might help established methods
achieve better performance in dynamic environments.
Alongside this architecture, we also demonstrate that adjusting
the training environment can lead to cooperative behaviors using
a standard Q-learning algorithm to take into account the effect of
external factors beyond each individual agent’s decision-making
in determining what behaviors can emerge when introducing ar-
tificial agents into open environments like societies. The focus in
multi-agent RL is predominantly based around stationarizing the
environment in order for agents to learn how to achieve optimal
outcomes in closed environments. This typically requires the same
agents to be used in training and testing. However, an overlooked
aspect of agent behavior is how to design environments to nurture
certain types of behavior. We present experimental results on how
untrained agents can learn to cooperate with other untrained agents
using standard Q-learning when interacting with static agents at
the same time.
RELATEDWORK AND MOTIVATION
Modeling multi-agent systems and designing learning algorithms
for dynamic settings is hard and the majority of work in this area
focuses on competitive, zero-sum games. A common approach is
to simply have each agent treat all other agents as part of the envi-
ronment and learn independently, however, this generally leads to
less than optimal performance [12, 28]. Firstly, a naive implementa-
tion of experience replay is not suitable for dynamically changing
environments [1, 27]. Others have employed importance sampling
in order to stabilize the application of replay buffers where ex-
periences that are collected from “old" environments can still be
used to update Q-values [10, 33]. Secondly, agents have to account
for actions taken by other agents in their Q-value approximations
[4]. Finally, learning to play optimally against just an opponent’s
current behavior may trap players in undesirable states, as can be
the case in social dilemmas, as there is no consistent and suitable
method of exploration.
However, while Q-learning and other reinforcement learning
algorithms have shown to perform well in zero-sum games for
single player, there has been less work in analyzing their resulting
behavior when trained in general-sum games. While in zero-sum
games, the rewards between two opposing agents are negatively
correlated, in general-sum games, the rewards between two oppos-
ing agents can be correlated arbitrarily as the resulting outcome for
one individual doesn’t necessarily directly impact the outcome for
others. This case is generally more representative of interactions in
the real-world. The accepted baseline solution for such games is the
Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, each player has chosen a
strategy and neither player can benefit by changing their strategy
unilaterally and it is proven to exist for every finite game. Inspired
by this approach, several game-theoretic reinforcement learning
algorithms have been proposed to solve general-sum games such
as Nash Q-learning. This algorithm modifies its update such that
its update is based on the expectation that agents would take their
equilibrium actions [11].
There is a parallel here between the goal of agent-tracking
methods and Nash Equilibrium as agent-tracking methods look
to identify the opponent’s strategy and update assuming only small
changes in the opponent’s behavior. However, while they may
account for the opponent’s strategy, they both look to perform
updates conditioned on the opponent’s current behavior. This is
a flawed approach for cooperation games as a key aspect of the
game involves adapting to your opponent’s behavior and therefore
doesn’t consider how an agent’s learning influences how its oppo-
nent’s behavior will change.
The study of sequential social dilemmas, notably the IPD, has
been prevalent across numerous disciplines such as game theory,
economics, and across social sciences as a way of analyzing complex
behaviors such as altruism, reciprocity and cooperation [18, 22, 25].
A strategy known as Tit-For-Tat (TFT) where an agent cooperates
on the first move and then replicates an opponent’s previous action,
known as equivalent retaliation, is a simple strategy yet has shown
to be one of the most effective strategies in the IPD and has served
as a basis for the modeling of many real-world behaviors [2]. So-
cial dilemmas like the IPD have proven to be an effective training
ground for multi-agent RL as they might involve cooperation as
a viable method of achieving optimal performance against fixed
policies as well as learning agents [16, 26, 35]. In order to perform
well in social dilemmas, agents must learn to forgo their desire
for early rewards and “agree" on strategies that will benefit those
involved. Many agents designed for Axelrod tournaments utilize
reciprocating behavior which is the general philosophy behind the
Tit-For-Tat strategy whereas others employ more grudging tech-
niques to manoeuvre opponents into cooperating.
Leibo et al. have attempted to train Q-learning agents for se-
quential social dilemmas so as to analyze how conflict, competition,
and cooperation can emerge via a multiplayer Wolfpack hunting
game and a Gathering game [15]. Replay buffers of a fixed capacity
were used to try and accommodate for the multiple learners; once
filled, they were refreshed so that the agent emphasized training
on more recent experiences. A more recently popular approach
to multi-agent reinforcement learning involves policy prediction
which, alongside Q-learning (independent learners), we will con-
trast our approach with. We emphasize this approach because we
think that it closely captures a necessary element of multi-agent
learning: understanding opponent behavior and incorporating it
directly into learning. It expands on methods like fictitious play
[7] and joint action learning (JAL) to more accurately represent
an opponent’s policy [5, 19] and enables coordinations (in coop-
erative games). Tesauro presents Hyper-Q learning, which learns
the value of mixed strategies instead of base actions by estimating
opponent actions using observed data and evaluates it using Rock-
Paper-Scissors [32]. He further argues that Hyper-Q learning may
be effective against agents even if they are persistently dynamic.
This has been corroborated by other research employing similar
philosophy of policy prediction. Experiments on Starcraft and other
abstract games that require complex multi-agent coordination have
shown that this methodology significantly improves performance
compared to independent learners trained with Q-learning though
they are often combined with other techniques, e.g., sampling tech-
niques and a centralized value function [10, 17]. However, as we
will demonstrate in our experiments, these types of methods do not
perform adequately in social dilemmas as they aim to shape learn-
ing around what is happening currently rather than what could
happen in the future. In contrast, our approach focuses directly on
understanding the consequence of actions on opponent’s behavior
and incorporates that knowledge directly into agent learning via
an adjusted reward function.
The use of social behavior metrics is another approach to tackle the
issue of describing what is really happening in a state at any mo-
ment in time in decentralized learning environments [24]. However,
it is difficult to determine how these metrics should be designed as
they are contextually dependent on the environment. Matignon et
al. achieve cooperative behavior in a decentralized RL system using
a modified update equation that is conditioned on the size of the
reward [20]. Another decentralized method by Yu et al. attempts to
embed emotional context into agents to drive them to learn cooper-
ative behaviors using various metrics to represent an agent’s drive
and emotions relative to neighbouring agents [34]. However, these
approaches represent only the current standings that are available
without an indication of how things may or may not change which
we maintain is essential to developing cooperative behavior. An
approach that also emphasizes integrating future behavior of one’s
opponents is LOLA which looks to consider opponent learning,
optimizing its return using a one-step look ahead which requires
direct access to the opposing agent’s parameters [9]. Our approach
differs in a number of ways. Firstly, we identify two distinct phases.
The first phase is the probing phase where each agent can probe
the opponent agent in order to gather information about how their
opponent’s strategy changes after an update and adjust any col-
lected experiences. We use a defined time horizon to determine the
number of updates to the opponent’s strategy to consider. In the
second phase, the agent trains on the adjusted experiences only.
Secondly, with the addition of the probing phase, the agent’s do not
need to have information about the parameters of the opponent
agent or need to track their strategy in advance.
PRELIMINARIES
Q-Learning
Q-learning is a popular off-policy reinforcement learning technique
to learn optimal behaviors. An agent trained with Q-learning looks
to take actions that maximize its expected cumulative reward. A
value function for a policy π is given by
V π (s) = E[
T∑
i=1
γ i−1ri |s0 = s,π ] ∀s ∈ S (1)
Among all possible value functions there exists a maximum
optimal value function V ∗ = maxπ V π (s) ∀s ∈ S and an opti-
mal policy that corresponds to the optimal value function π∗ =
argmaxπ V π (s) ∀s ∈ S. The Q-function, Q , is defined as the ex-
pected cumulative reward received by an agent starting in s , picking
action a and behaving optimally from that point onward. We can
therefore write the optimal Q-function as
Q∗(s,a) = r (s,a) + γEp(s ′ |s,a)[V ∗(s ′)] (2)
From our definition of the optimal value function, we can derive that
V ∗ = maxa Q∗(s,a) and therefore, π∗ = argmaxπ Qπ (s,a). The
optimal policy is therefore the policy that chooses the action with
the highest Q-value at every state. However, we can see clearly in (2)
that the optimal Q-value is subject to state transition distribution
remaining the same. This is sensible in single-agent games but
not in multi-agent settings since we expect the state distribution
to change as agents change their behavior and therefore affect
the resulting state transitions as they are learning. Agent-tracking
methods expand on this, conditioning the transition to s ′ on both
the agent’s own action as well as any opponent’s actions in order
to better approximate their Q-values, however, as we will see, they
fail to achieve the desired solution for cooperation-type games like
the IPD.
Hyper-Q-Learning
Hyper-Q-learning is an agent-tracking technique and an extension
of Q-learning for multi-agent systems. It estimates an opponent’s
mixed strategy y and then evaluates the best response. In the single
agent case, the Hyper-Q function Qπ (s,y,a) is adjusted such that
Qπ (s,y,a) = r (s,y,a) + γ max
a′
Qπ (s ′,y′,a′)
where y′ is a new estimated opponent strategy in s ′. Variations of
Hyper-Q have performed well using deep neural networks with
sampling modifications to the replay buffer. A similar approach in
multi-agent scenarios has been implemented with success using
actor critic techniques such that the target value of agent j is
Qπj (s,a1, ...,aN ) =
r j (s,a1, ...,aN ) + γEs ′ max
a′
Qπj (s ′,a′1, ...,a′N )|a−j=π−j
where −j denotes all agents except of agent j. In this paper, we
use a variation of Hyper-Q for simplicity in the IPD adopting a
separate neural network to estimate an opponent’s next action
directly from an observation and optimize by taking recent sam-
ples of an agent from a replay buffer. While agent-tracking meth-
ods have performed better than independent learners, they still
suffer from a problem of non-stationarity, which is that the dis-
tribution of states changes as each agent updates their policy . If
the updates to π−j are small and the environment is less dynamic
then pi (s ′ |s,a1, ...,aN )|a−j=π−j ≈ pi+1(s ′ |s,a1, ...,aN )|a−j=π−j , and
is sufficient for calculating an optimal policy though this problem is
made more difficult with more learners. Furthermore, since agents
cannot anticipate how behavior will change in the future, they
cannot avoid getting trapped in socially deficient Nash Equilib-
ria (which are optimal and dominant strategies given knowledge
only of an opponent’s current policy). We contrast this with our
approach that, instead, emphasizes an awareness of how an agent’s
actions can influence an opponent’s future response as we argue
that optimizing against the current policy of an opponent can trap
agents into policies that result in both parties receiving inadequate
rewards.
Forms of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a simple game that serves as the
basis for research on social dilemmas. The premise of the game
is that two partners in crime are imprisoned separately and each
are offered leniency if they provide evidence against the other.
Each player can choose between two actions: cooperation (C) or
defection (D), and the payoffs of the game are displayed in Figure 1.
The game is modeled so thatT > R > P > S and 2R > T +S . Solving
this from a game-theoretic perspective, the dominant strategy is to
defect, however, if both players take this action then they arrive at
a Nash Equilibrium that is socially deficient. Originally, the PD is
a one round game, but the IPD is a sequential PD often studied to
understand the effects of previous outcomes and the emergence of
cooperative behaviors.
SD C D
C R, R S, T
D T, S P, P
IPD C D
C 3, 3 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Figure 1: Payoff Matrix for Social Dilemmas and Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The motivation to defect comes from
fear of an opponent defecting or acting greedily to gain the
maximum rewardwhen one anticipates the opponentmight
cooperate.
LEARNING THROUGH PROBING
In this section, we present and summarize the architecture and
learning methodology of the probing technique that we apply to
RL agents. Each agent consists of two separate components that
we term the probe and the player. Each player i has a policy πpi
parameterized by θpi . Each probe, similarly, has a policy πbi param-
eterized by θbi . The role of the probe is to generate experiences
(st ,at , rt+1, st+1) that account for opponent strategy changing due
to learning when performing action at after observing st . The even-
tual consequences of this action are measured by aggregating the
rewards of the total sequence of events τ over a finite time horizon
T . This is an adjusted experience to capture the affects of taking
that action on the opponent’s policy which will eventually be used
to train the player component. To start, each probe must gauge
the consequences of a type of action. Paired with an opponent, the
probes explore the environment and store experiences in a replay
buffer. These experiences are then grouped according to the ac-
tions of the opponent. The probe then updates on the subset of
experiences and continues to play versus its opponent. Each probe
update is based on the set of opposing experiences stored. After
taking a one-step update based on these initial experiences, the
probes play against each other according to their learned policies
and repeat the process for T updates. Eventually, the sequence
τ = (s0,a0, r1, s1, ..., sT−1,aT−1, rT , sT ) is stored.
During the probing phase, the experiences are grouped by the
tuple (a1,a2), the agent’s action and opponent’s action similarly
to JAL and agent-tracking methods. Alternatively, actions could
grouped according to the reward outcome. In the context of the
PD, grouping actions according to the opponent’s action or the
reward outcome is the same, however, in general, grouping while
considering the opponent’s action is less ambiguous.
After the probes have interacted and generated experiences,
the rewards of the resulting sequences τ are adjusted such that
R(τ ) = ∑Tt=1 ηt−1rt and are used to train the player components
of the agents. η is an added discount through updates term to de-
termine how many future interactions the agent should consider.
By manipulating the value of η we can determine how each player
values the approximated long-term outcome and η = 0 indicates
an approach identical to Q-learning. The gradient of the player
updates according to
Qπi+1 (s,a) ← Qπi (s,a) − R(τ ) + γ max
a
Qπi (s ′,a′)
After training has concluded on the adjusted experiences, the
learned policy is transferred to the probe. When only one of the
participants is learning to maximize an RL objective function the
architecture is adjusted so that the probe interacts directly with the
opponent rather than establishing a probing phase for both agents.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the methodology and experimental
setup. The first subsection describes how RL agents train against
Axelrod agents simultaneously, and compares and contrasts the
results of Q-learning and Hyper-Q-learning to examine how policy
prediction improves learning under certain conditions. The sec-
ond subsection describes how we tackle these difficulties using a
probing technique and Q-learning to account for behavior changes
through updates and investigating the influence of this new learning
methodology on the emergence of cooperation. The default neural
networks had two hidden layers with 40 hidden units and ReLU
activation functions. Agents were trained with gradient descent
with a buffer size of 1e5, learning rate of 1e-4 and a batch size of
300. Exploration, ϵ , was initially set to 1.0 and decreased linearly
with iterations, stopping at 0.1. The discount rate γ was set to 0.99.
Target networks were also used to further stabilize training. After
testing multiple values for the time horizon, T , we set it to 5. Us-
ing values greater than 5 produced results that were very similar
while using values smaller than 5 had a higher variance. Finally, the
Figure 2: Learning through Probing architecture diagram involving two RL agents. 1) After exploring the environment, the
probe component trains on subsets of experiences to learn consequences for actions. Actions are then selected according to a
learned policy. 2) Experiences are collected into a replay buffer and adjusted. 3) The player component trains on the adjusted
experiences. 4) The players are matched against each other after training. 5) In continuously adaptive games, probes could
adopt learned player policies and adapt their strategies over time.
Algorithm 1 Learning through Probing
1: Input:← θb1i ,θb2i
2: for i in ranдe(0, episode) do
3: ob1i , o
b2
i ← Dilemma(aдent1,aдent2)
4: a1i ← θb1i , a2i ← θb2i
5: (ob1i+1, rb1i ), (ob2i+1, rb2i ) ← Dilemma.play(a1i ,a2i )
6: replay_buffer1.append(ob1i ,a1i , r1i ,ob1i+1)
7: replay_buffer2.append(ob2i ,a2i , r2i ,ob2i+1)
8: end for
9: group experiences according to joint actions(a1i ,a2i )
10: and store in separate buffers
11: for buffer in replay_buffers do
12: Update θb1t ,θ
b2
t
13: ob1t , o
b2
t ← bu f f er
14: for t in ranдe(0,T ) do
15: a1t ← θb1t , a2t ← θb2t
16: (ob1t+1, rb1i ), (ob2t+1, rb2t ) ← Dilemma.play(a1t ,a2t )
17: Update θb1t ,θ
b2
i
18: end for
19: τ1 ← (ob1t ,a1t , r1t ,ob1t+1,a1t+1, r1t+1, ...,a1T , r1T ,ob1T+1)
20: τ2 ← (ob2t ,a2t , r2t ,ob2t+1,a2t+1, r2t+1, ...,a2T , r2T ,ob2T+1)
21: end for
22: reset θb1i ,θ
b2
i
23: Adjust overall sequences τ1,τ2
24: Train players, θp1i ,θ
p2
i on adjusted experiences, τ1,τ2
third section describes the external aspects of learning in artificial
societies and the impact on agent behavior.
RL Agents versus Axelrod Agents
The Axelrod library [13] contains an extensive set of strategies that
have been used in previous Axelrod tournaments as well as those
that have been rigorously covered in scientific literature. We will
refer to the collection of these strategies as “Axelrod agents”. All
strategies in the tournament follow a simple set of rules: players
are unaware of the number of turns in a match, players carry no
acquired state between matches, players cannot observe the out-
come of other matches and players cannot manipulate or inspect
their opponent in any way beyond what is required in a match. We
highlight a diverse set of strategies taken from the Axelrod library
that will be used as opponents.
Tit for Tat (TFT). The Tit for Tat strategy is a forgiving strategy
that will cooperate on the first move and then perform the same
action as the opponent’s most recent move.
Punisher. The Punisher strategy is a grudging strategy that
starts by cooperating, however, if at any point its opponent defects,
it will defect for memory length where memory length is propor-
tional to the opponent’s historical percentage of defecting.
Forgetful Grudger. The Forgetful Grudger strategy is a grudg-
ing strategy which defects for a fixed length of time if an opponent
defects at any point. If an opponent cooperates for long enough it
forgets its grudge and will cooperate until it sees another defection.
Prober. The Prober strategy plays an initial sequence of moves
to feel out an opponent’s strategy. It keeps a count of defections
that are retaliating and defections that are unmerited. If the number
of justified defections and number of unjustified defections differs
by more than 2, cooperate for the next 5 turns and then play TFT’s
strategy. Otherwise defect forever.
Sneaky. The Sneaky strategy is an original strategy that tracks
the three most recent actions of the opponent. If all three actions
are to cooperate, then it will defect. Also, if the total number of
opponent defections are greater than the total number of opponent
(a) Average cumulative rewards and standard deviation for various RL agents
over 20 encounters at numerous training iterations.
(b) Average rewards and standard deviation of LTP agents over 20 timesteps
trained with various η values.
Figure 3: (a) The blue line shows the results achieved by LTP agents trained with η = 0.99. These agents learn to cooperate
early and consistently with decreasing variance with more training iterations indicating stable performance. Trained with
η = 0.01, LTP agents are slower to converge than Deep-Q or Hyper-Q agents, however, achieve similar results with consistency.
Hyper-Q agents are the quickest in learning to defect. (b) Agents trained with higher η values learn cooperative policies with
little error rate. A threshold value specific to the used configuration of the IPD is noted at approximately η = 0.7.
cooperations then it will defect.
Some of these agents, like the Prober, are not stationary to begin
with but converge to stationary distributions given enough time.
We refer to these as quasi-stationary behaviors. Q-learning, Hyper-
Q-learning and LTP agents are each trained to play against the
above agents. Agents are able to observe the previous four actions
taken by themselves and their opponent. Each match lasts for 100
timesteps. Agents are paired using a round robin matchmaking
format. This was run for 10,000 episodes. For Q-learning and Hyper-
Q-learning agents, ϵ was set to 1.0 initially and decreased linearly
with iterations until it reached 0.1.
RL Agents versus RL Agents
We carry out experiments in order to see how Q-learning agents,
Hyper-Q-learning agents and LTP agents perform against their
counterparts in the IPD. Each state was characterized by the agent’s
and its opponent’s previous four interactions. Agents had no in-
formation about who they were playing with beyond what was
available in the observation data. While versus Axelrod agents,
though Q-learning and Hyper-Q learning agents keeping an explo-
ration rate at 1.0 is feasible when playing against static strategies,
Hyper-Q relies on developing accurate predictions of an opponent’s
next move and so we ensure that the observed policies are non-
random. We train LTP agents against one another using η values
of 0.99, 0.7, 0.5, and 0.01 to demonstrate the effect of accounting for
behavioral adaptations. These agents play against each other for
1000 iterations. After each iteration agents would play the IPD for
20 timesteps and the cumulative reward was recorded.
External Factors Influencing Agent Learning
The emphasis in current multiagent RL is to stationarize the envi-
ronment using techniques that give the agent more information
about the dynamics of the environment. However, in the previous
section, we use an adaptation to training without changing the
RL objective function or using a centralized control function. In
this experiment we will also adapt training of Q-learning agents so
they develop cooperative tendencies by inserting other agents into
the environment that act as regulators. In open environments such
as artificial societies, agents are likely to come into contact with
unseen scenarios and their learning in these new environment is
hard to predict. We are interested in understanding what happens
when an agent is inserted in an unseen multi-agent environment
with given dynamics, like a society with established social norms
and how we can control for certain types of behavior without spec-
ifying changes to the agent’s objective function. Evaluating these
developmental aspects may provide key insights to understanding
how types of behaviors are established in a society or how certain
behaviors might provide the basis for stable social norms while
others might not. We look to demonstrate in a simple, yet insightful,
way that agents’ behaviors may change in society based on their
encounters with others and how this analysis can be useful for
understanding social interactions.
We start with an environment that features only two players,
both RL agents that train with a Q-learning update. TFT agents are
added one-by-one to the environment to observe the changes in
Q-values. Sneaky agents and Punisher agents are also added to see
how cumulative reward increases and decreases. The format was
(a) 0 TFT agents (b) 1 TFT agents (c) 2 TFT agents
(d) 1 Sneaky agent, 0 TFT agents (e) 1 Sneaky agent, 1 TFT agents (f) 1 Sneaky agent, 2 TFT agents
(g) 1 Punisher agent, 0 TFT agents (h) 1 Punisher agent, 1 TFT agents (i) 1 Punisher agent, 2 TFT agents
Figure 4: Adapting surroundings using TFT agents to get two independent Q-learning agents to cooperate in the IPD. (a) Q-
learning agents learn independently to play the IPD and both learn defecting policies to achieve the minimum cumulative
reward. As more TFT agents are introduced, cumulative reward rises. In (b) one TFT agent agents perform significantly better
and in (c) two TFT agents both Q-learning agents learn to cooperate consistently achieving the maximum cumulative reward
with less variance. We further display the changes in agent reward with a Sneaky agent and TFT agents, displayed in (d-f), and
a Punisher agent and TFT agents, displayed in (g-i).
modeled as a random encounters where each agent was matched
with a random opponent with equal probability. Each match lasted
for 20 timesteps, with each agent performing a total of 500 updates,
one after each match. RL agents implemented ϵ-greedy policies
with ϵ decreasing linearly.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Optimal Policies under Stationary Distributions
Individually, Q-learning agents and Hyper-Q learning agents score
well against Axelrod agents due to their patterned behavior. The
strategies that Axelrod agents use can be considered stationary
and it is straightforward for the RL agents to learn an appropriate
policy to play when matched against these agents provided that
they have access to enough information to determine their strategy.
In the case of the Sneaky agent, it requires at least four previous
interactions at every time step in order to learn the optimal policy
as it can then determine what the pattern in its behavior is. Both Q-
learning and Hyper-Q-learning perform well against these agents.
However, against the Prober agent, Hyper-Q performs significantly
better and more consistently than either of the other two RL agents
demonstrating an advantage of agent-tracking techniques in quasi-
stationary environments. The average scores over 100 timesteps are
recorded in Table 1. Overall, whenmatched with the Axelrod agents,
LTP agents achieve desirable results versus all the opponents and
perform at least as well as Q-learning though Hyper-Q outperforms
both.
TFT Punisher Prober Sneaky FG
Q 300 300 166.7 391.6 300
Hyper-Q 300 300 305 400 300
LTP 300 300 154.5 384.9 300
Table 1: Average scores vs. Static agents
Incorporating Information about Future
Behaviors
In the case of LTP versus LTP agents, we observe that the agents
are able to consistently achieve maximum cumulative reward when
playing in the IPD. A variety of learned policies can be observed by
setting η to different values. By setting the value of η to 0.99 (the
same for all the agents), LTP agents heavily favor cooperation and
consistently learn to cooperate with each other. In Figure 3 we see
the scores of LTP agents trained when η = [0.01, 0.5, 0.7, 0.99]. Be-
tween η = 0.01 and η = 0.5 there are no stark differences and both
result in defecting policies. When η = 0.7 there is a noticeable sep-
aration from a “defect only”-type policy. LTP agents with η values
of less than 0.7 learn to defect following a similar trajectory to that
of Q-learning and Hyper-Q-learning. With η greater than 0.7 both
agents learn cooperative policies to achieve the maximum cumu-
lative reward. When matching Q-learning agents with each other,
they learn defecting policies every time over the course of 10,000
iterations. The number of times they defect increases exponentially
until every action taken is to defect. While Hyper-Q-learning agents
outperformed the other algorithms versus stationary agents, they
performs poorly in this scenario. As the exploration rate decreases,
the predicted probability of the opponent defecting increases and
Hyper-Q agents learn to defect the quickest with negligible vari-
ance. We expect this will be further compounded using sampling
techniques and buffer refreshing for social dilemmas as the new
policies learned by its opponent will involve a higher likelihood
to defect than before. Since the optimal policy to play against an
opponent that is increasingly likely to defect is to defect oneself,
predicting what the opponent might do next is not a viable strategy
to maximize cumulative reward in the IPD. However, as LTP agents
demonstrated, it is beneficial to take actions that maximize reward
conditioned on changes in an opponent’s behavior.
Cooperative Behavior in Presence of Stable
Norms
This experiment demonstrates how we can adjust the learning of
our Q-learning agents by adapting the training procedure. We dis-
play the changes in the behavior of two Q-learning agents that
would normally learn defect under a regular training procedure af-
ter interacting with regulating TFT agents. As can be seen in Figure
3, neither Q-learning agents nor agent-tracking agents like Hyper-
Q learning learn to cooperate with one another when matched
together in the IPD. However, we can show that tailoring their
overall experience without explicitly changing the cost function
or reward function, they can learn to cooperate with other RL
agents which is an interesting find as it better represents how these
agents would act in societal-like contexts rather than closed envi-
ronments. By adding TFT agents to the environment and modeling
it as random-encounters, the Q-values associated with cooperative
behavior increase as the punishment for defecting is more likely
to be immediate. In this way, the strategy of defecting is regulated
by other existing agents. When facing other agents that are also
exploring the environment, a Q-learning agent may be able to reap
rewards from defecting behavior before other agents have adapted.
This would cause the rest of the agents to also learn defecting be-
havior as shown in Figure 3. However, in a more strict environment,
this behavior can be punished. By inserting more TFT agents into
the environment, this behavior can be eliminated altogether and
agents will learn to cooperate with one another consistently as
shown in Figure 4. In addition, we can see that with only additional
TFT agents in the environment, both agents achieve similar end
rewards with neither consistently exploiting the other. In contrast,
when a Sneaky agent is present, agent 1 barely manages to attain
any reward as it has learned some cooperative behavior while agent
2 has learned primarily to defect due to the Sneaky agent’s presence.
When two TFT agents are introduced as shown in Figure 4 (f), de-
fecting behavior can be regulated. However, one agent still manages
to take advantage of the other and they do not achieve maximum
cumulative reward as consistently. Surprisingly, the addition of a
Punisher agent is not effective in producing cooperative behavior
between agents. Though agents are punished in a similar fashion to
TFT (immediate retaliation) this scenario lacks the consistency of
TFT and the involvement of another RL agent exploring simultane-
ously. From these experiments we see that TFT is most successful
out of the selected agents to regulate behavior and encourage RL
agents to be cooperative. Hyper-Q agents do not learn to coop-
erate with each other in this setting. When paired versus other
Hyper-Q learning agents, they continue to learn defecting policies
when matched together and are unable to achieve the same results.
In this regard, it is more difficult to regulate their strategies and
are therefore these agents are less suitable for cooperation games.
These initial experiments provide insights about the emergence of
cooperation (or other behaviors) in the presence of environments
or societies with stable pre-established dynamics, i.e., social norms.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a novel architecture for agents to
learn optimal strategies for the IPD where elements of cooperation
and competition are prevalent and important. Our LTP agents suc-
cessfully learn to cooperate with one another by demonstrating
changes to behavior via the use of probes and adjusting experiences
to reflect these changes. We also show that these agents are able
to learn optimal strategies when matched against stationary and
quasi-stationary agents that have been used in Axelrod tourna-
ments without adapting the objective function, focusing only on
variations to training. We plan to focus on scaling this research to
investigate more advanced social dilemmas and to incorporate the
useful aspects of agent-tracking techniques to broaden the applica-
bility of our approach. Building on this work, we also plan to study
further how different types of behaviors may emerge in agent so-
cieties and how theymight develop according to their surroundings.
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